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CRIMINAL LAW CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS
in support of his defense of insanity, testified
that, among other things, he had stuck his fist
through a wall, thrown dishes out of a window,
attempted to throw a crying baby out of the
window, and physically threatened the life of their
unborn child. To supplement this, the defense
offered testimony from the defendant's sister-in-
law, brother-in-law, and two friends as to various
other actions indicating insanity. In answering a
hypothetical case based on these actions, a neuro-
psychiatrist replied that he thought the defendant
had been mentally ill for a number of years. The
government, in rebuttal, presented the accused's
closest friend who declared that he had never
witnessed any irrational acts on the part of the
defendant. In addition, two psychiatrists testified
that in their opinion the defendant was not suffer-
ing from any mental disease or defect. While pre-
senting his closing argument to the jury, the prose-
cuting attorney remarked that he believed all
of the testimony offered by the defendant's wife
to be perjury. Later on in his summation, counsel
for the prosecution stated that he would not make
a charge of false testimony unless he could prove
it. The United States Court of Appeals, with one
judge concurring and four judges dissenting, re-
versed the defendant's conviction of first degree
murder and held that comment by an attorney
to the jury as would indicate personal knowledge
of perjury is reversible error when there is no
evidence in the record to support such a comment.
Stewart v. United States, 247 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir.
1957).
The court noted the fact that the defendant's
insanity defense rested chiefly on the testimony
of his wife concerning his irrational conduct and
the hypothetical questions based on this conduct
asked a doctor, who testified that the defendant
was mentally ill. In addition, after searching the
record the court could not find any evidence
contradicting the wife's testimony. The court
concluded that the prosecutor's statements,
indicating to the jury that the defendant's wife
had committed perjury, amounted to unsworn
testimony by the prosecutor. This, the court said,
was improper conduct so prejudicial that a new
trial was necessitated, even though the defendant
had not raised this point in his appeal. The court
expressly refused to decide the question of "whether
it is ever proper for a prosecutor to hurl charges
of perjury at witnesses."
The concurring opinion indicated that the
doubt created by the prosecution's claim of per-
jury was not cured by the general statement of
the prosecuting attorney at the beginning of his
argument that the jury is the sole judge of the
facts, or by an instruction by the trial judge to
the same effect. The concurrer then stated that
"in a capital case specific error of serious character
may not be disregarded because of scrupulous
correctness of the trial in other respects", and
it is the obligation of a reviewing court to search
the record for reversible error.
While agreeing with the majority as to the
general proposition that the prosecutor may not
assert that testimony constituted perjury unless
there is evidence in the record to support such a
contention, the four judges dissenting denied that
the prosecutor had exceeded these bounds. In
support of this position they pointed to the fact
that the defendant's wife had never complained
previously of the alleged acts. Joined with her
personal interest, and the testimony of the de-
fendant's close friend that he had never witnessed
any insane acts on the part of the defendant, the
dissent concluded that there was evidence in the
record justifying the jury's disbelief of the de-
fense's witnesses. Even assuming error, the dissent
argued that it was not prejudicial because: it was
clearly the prosecutor's belief and not a statement
of fact; the trial as a whole was completely fair;
and finally, the prosecutor had made it patently
clear to the jury that his summation was to be
taken only as his personal recollection, and not
as evidence.
Consequences of Committing Felony While on
Parole Applied to Delinquent Parolee-The
defendant was found guilty of a crime in New
York and sentenced to a term of from five to ten
years in prison. After serving three and one half
years, he was released on parole in 1945. On
November 2, 1949, Texas authorities lodged a
parole violation complaint against the defendant,
and a New York warrant for his arrest was issued
on November 7, 1949. On the same day, the de-
fendant was arrested pursuant to the warrant,
but released on bail eight days later. A Texas
court heard the matter on November 25, 1949,
but no one appeared on behalf of the New York
parole board to take the defendant into custody.
However, on December 16, 1949, the New York
parole board declared the defendant delinquent as
of November 2, 1949. The Texas authorities later
arrested the defendant on January 13, 1950 for a
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